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Comments 
THE CASE AGAINST A DELAWARE STATE 
COMMON LAW FRAUD ACTION FROM ALLEGED 
MISSTATEMENTS IN A FILING REQUIRED BY 
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 
Michael Drory* 
In December 2009, Judge Laster, the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 
newest Vice Chancellor, allowed a common law fraud action by a losing 
tender offeror against the winning tender offeror to proceed past the motion 
to dismiss stage, thus implying the availability of a damages award.  This 
paper will first provide a brief summary of the case and will then address 
the legal and policy implications of allowing such an action. 
Specifically, disgruntled tender offerors are not part of the protected 
class that Congress sought to protect under the Williams Act.
1
  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has already concluded that tender offerors 
do not have a private right of action under the Williams Act.
2
  Allowing a 
common law damages award stemming from disclosures required by the 
Williams Act has the potential to disrupt the market for corporate control.  
Because of the federalism policy concerns raised by fashioning a remedy 
contrary to federal securities law, this could also undermine Delaware’s 
ultimate interest in remaining the preeminent state of incorporation by 
accelerating the possibility of the federalization of corporate law. 
 
         * J.D. candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2012.  The author would 
like to thank Professor William Bratton and the Comment Editors of the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law for their comments, advice and support. 
 1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d), 14(e) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78m(d), 78n(d)–(f) (2006)).  See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977) 
(discussing the legislative history of the Williams Act and its application to losing tender 
offerors). 
 2. Piper, 430 U.S. at 35. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION OF THE NACCO CASE 
On December 21, 2009, Judge Laster, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s newest Vice Chancellor, denied Harbinger’s (defendant hedge 
fund) motion to dismiss NACCO’s (plaintiff) common law fraud claim 
regarding Harbinger’s 13D filings during a takeover attempt of Applica 
Incorporated (“Applica”).
3
  Because this case will serve as the basis of 
discussion for the rest of the paper, it is important to introduce a brief 
synopsis of the facts. 
NACCO is a holding company that owns Hamilton Beach, a 
manufacturer of small appliances.
4
  In 2005, NACCO approached Applica, 
manufacturer of the George Foreman Grill, about the possibility of a 
strategic transaction with Hamilton Beach.
5
  In early 2006, Applica’s board 
authorized merger discussions with NACCO and updated its non-disclosure 
agreement.
6
  At the same time NACCO agreed to a standstill provision.
7
  
Over the next months, Applica’s board of directors decided to pursue 
NACCO’s merger proposal, conducted due diligence on Hamilton Beach’s 
operations, and, on July 24, 2006, the parties announced the Hamilton 
Beach Merger Agreement.
8
 
In the meantime, Harbinger had been purchasing Applica shares, and 
on March 13, 2006, Harbinger filed a Schedule 13G disclosing its 8.9% 
ownership of Applica common stock.
9
  Over the next couple of months, 
under the direction of principal Phillip Falcone, Harbinger had acquired 
24.7% of Applica’s outstanding common shares.
10
  On May 14, 2006, 
Harbinger filed a Schedule 13D disclosing its position that the shares were 
being held for “investment purposes only” and that the acquisitions of the 
Shares were made “in the ordinary course of [Harbinger’s] business or 
investment activities . . . .”
11
 
During the time Harbinger had been acquiring shares, Falcone had 
other ideas about strategic alternatives for Applica.
12
  Falcone had engaged 
in discussions with his advisor, David Maura, regarding the possibility of 
acquiring Applica along with Salton, Inc.—a competing small electronic 
 
 3. NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., 997 A.2d 1, 7 (Del. Ch. 2009).  On February 
11, 2011, it was reported that Harbinger paid NACCO $60 million to settle the lawsuit.  
Mark Maremont, Harbinger Settles in Nacco Suit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2011, at C3. 
 4. NACCO, 997 A.2d at 7. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 7–8. 
 9. Id. at 8. 
 10. Id. at 9. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 8. 
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appliance distributor—and combining the two.
13
  According to the 
complaint, Harbinger began to effectuate this plan in May 2006 when it 
began its acquisition of Salton.
14
 
By June 21, 2006, Harbinger had increased its position in Applica to 
32% of the common outstanding shares.
15
  At this time, Harbinger filed 
another Schedule 13D which stated that it had “acquired [Applica] Shares . 
. . for investment.”
16
  Thus, this Schedule 13D differed from the previous 
Schedule 13D in that it had dropped the word “only” from the disclosure.
17
  
Harbinger added a disclosure stating that the company “evaluate[s] their 
investment in the Shares on a continual basis including, without limitation, 
for possible synergies with their other current investments.”
18
  Harbinger 
also disclosed that it “reserve[d] the right to be in contact with members of 
[Applica’s] management, the members of [Applica’s] Board of Directors, 
other significant shareholders and others regarding alternatives that 
[Applica] could employ to maximize shareholder value.”
19
  In the 
complaint, “NACCO allege[d] that these disclosures were false not only 
because Harbinger already planned to influence or control Applica, but also 
because . . . Harbinger had zeroed in on and was pursuing the specific 
alternative of an Applica-Salton combination.”
20
 
By August 17, 2006, Harbinger had acquired 39.24% of Applica’s 
outstanding common stock.
21
  In all of its August 2006 Schedule 13D 
filings, Harbinger repeated its position that it was holding shares for 
investment purposes and did not include any statements regarding 
intentions to influence or control Applica.
22
  According to the complaint, 
NACCO claimed that “in reliance on Harbinger’s Schedule 13D filings, 
Applica’s reassurances that Harbinger would support the deal, and 
Harbinger’s lack of any prior deal jump attempts, NACCO believed that 
Harbinger would not make a competing bid or seek to influence the 
outcome of the merger vote.”
23
 
On September 14, 2006, Harbinger filed a Schedule 13D/A amending 
its disclosures in its prior Schedule 13D forms and at the same time made a 
 
 13. Id. at 8–9. 
 14. See id. at 9 (alleging that by June 24, 2010 Harbinger had acquired $100 million of 
the company’s preferred stock and in excess of the $100 million in its debt). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 9. 
 21. Id. at 11. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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topping bid on the existing Hamilton Beach Merger Agreement.
24
  On 
October 10, 2006, Applica terminated the Hamilton Beach Merger 
Agreement and entered into a merger agreement with Harbinger.
25
  On 
October 19, Applica paid NACCO the $4 million termination fee and $2 
million in expense reimbursement under the Hamilton Beach Merger 
Agreement, which provided for such compensation in the event the 
Agreement was validly terminated to accept a topping bid.
26
 
On November 13, 2006, NACCO brought an action against Applica 
and Harbinger for specific performance of the Hamilton Beach Merger 
Agreement.
27
  After being informed that the Court could not facilitate a full 
trial prior to the projected closing of the Harbinger Merger, NACCO 
moved for a preliminary injunction but withdrew its injunction application 
after a preliminary exchange of documents.
28
  Over December 2006 and 
January 2007, NACCO and Harbinger engaged in a bidding contest for 
Applica with Harbinger ultimately succeeding with a tender offer of $8.25 
per share ($2.25 more than the price per share in the original Harbinger 
Merger Agreement).
29
  On January 24, 2007, Applica shareholders 
approved the Harbinger Merger Agreement and NACCO terminated its 
efforts to acquire Applica.
30
 
II.  NACCO’S COMMON LAW FRAUD CLAIM 
Central to NACCO’s fraud claim is that Applica’s preliminary proxy 
statement regarding the Harbinger Merger Agreement contained 
significantly different information than the Schedule 13D disclosures made 
by Harbinger throughout the first half of 2006.
31
  As Vice Chancellor 
Laster acknowledged in his opinion, there exists a jurisdictional issue of 
 
 24. See id. at 11 (amending disclosure stating that the Applica shares had been acquired 
“in order to acquire control of [Applica]” rather than the previously stated purpose of 
investment). 
 25. Id. at 12. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 13.  It should be noted that Harbinger had the advantage of owning 
approximately forty percent of the common stock; thus Harbinger was effectively bidding 
for only sixty percent of Applica, whereas NACCO, which had been limited by the standstill 
agreement, was bidding for all of Applica.  Id. 
 30. See id. at 13 (noting that, due to the additional bidding process, Applica increased 
NACCO’s termination fee from $4 million to $7 million and their expense reimbursement 
fee from $2 million to $3.3 million). 
 31. Id.  Specifically, the Applica proxy stated that Harbinger representatives had 
contacted Applica in mid-July concerning the possibility of a strategic transaction, whereas 
the 13D filings made by Harbinger at that time said that the shares were only being 
accumulated for investment purposes.  Id. 
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whether a Delaware court can provide common law fraud relief.
32
  Vice 
Chancellor Laster concluded that Delaware courts ultimately had the ability 
to enforce a common law fraud claim by relying on the text of Section 
28(a) of the Exchange Act which states that the Exchange Act “shall be in 
addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in 
equity . . . .”
33
  By allowing a common law fraud claim, this ruling has the 
potential to alter dramatically the landscape for hedge funds making 
disclosures under the Exchange Act.
34
  Given the enhanced scrutiny of 
Schedule 13D disclosures by the legal community
35
 the following analysis 
will focus on:  (1) whether state courts (specifically Delaware) should 
legally allow a private right of action by a disgruntled bidder on the 
grounds of common law fraud from allegedly misleading and/or false 
Schedule 13D disclosures; and (2) the policy ramifications of allowing 
such a claim—specifically who bears the burden of such a civil action. 
III.  WHETHER DELAWARE SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE COMMON LAW 
FRAUD ACTION TO CONTINUE 
A.  The Williams Act and Schedule 13D Disclosures 
In response to the growing use of cash tender offers as a means for 
achieving corporate takeovers, Congress passed the Williams Act as a set 
of amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).
36
  
Prior to the Williams Act, there was a void in disclosure requirements for 
tender offer transactions.
37
  Under the Williams Act, a potential takeover 
bidder must file a statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) “indicating . . . ‘the background and identity’ of the offeror, the 
source and amount of funds or other consideration to be used in making the 
purchases, the extent of the offeror’s holdings in the target corporation, and 
 
 32. Id. at 20. 
 33. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2006)). 
 34. Id. at 24.  Harbinger argued that it was “widely believed in the community of hedge 
funds who frequently file Schedule 13Ds that one need not disclose any intent other than an 
investment intent until one actually makes a bid.”  Id. at 28. 
 35. See, e.g., George R. Bason, Jr. & Justine Lee, Delaware Court Holds Misleading 
Schedule 13D May Give Rise to Damages Claim Under State Law, DAVIS POLK CLIENT 
NEWSFLASH, Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.davispolk.com/corporate_governance_delaware_ 
developments/ (follow “Delaware Court Holds Misleading Schedule 13D May Give Rise to 
Damages Claim Under State Law” hyperlink) (noting that the “Delaware Chancery Court 
decision raises the stakes for faulty compliance with Section 13(d) filings”). 
 36. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)  (discussing the history 
of the Williams Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d)–(f). 
 37. Piper, 430 U.S. at 22 (citing 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. 
Williams)). 
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the offeror’s plans with respect to the target corporation’s business or 
corporate structure.”
38
 
B.  Tender Offerors Do Not Have a Private Right of Action Under §14(e) 
The Exchange Act contains an anti-fraud provision in §14(e) which 
states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact . . . in 
connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders . . . .”
39
  
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, the Supreme Court faced a very similar 
issue to the one in the NACCO case.  Specifically, the Piper Court 
addressed the issue of whether “an unsuccessful tender offeror in a contest 
for control of a corporation has an implied cause of action for damages 
under §14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .”
40
  The Supreme 
Court noted that Section 14(e) does not explicitly authorize a private right 
of action like other sections of the Exchange Act.
41
  However, the Court did 
acknowledge that “in some circumstances a private cause of action can be 
implied with respect to the 1934 Act’s antifraud provisions, even though 
the relevant provisions are silent as to remedies.”
42
  The Court explained 
that “where congressional purposes are likely to be undermined absent 
private enforcement, private remedies may be implied in favor of the 
particular class intended to be protected by the statute.”
43
  The Court then 
conducted an in-depth examination of the legislative history to determine 
the congressional purpose underlying the specific statutory prohibition in § 
14(e).
44
 
In Piper, the Court concluded by noting that, because the main 
purpose of the Exchange Act was to protect individual investors, it might 
be appropriate to imply a private action for them, but since Congress did 
not intend §14(e) to benefit the actual tender offerors, it would be 
inappropriate to infer a cause of action for them.
45
  The question arises:  
 
 38. Piper, 430 U.S. at 22–23; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d). 
 39. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §14(e) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)). 
 40. Piper, 430 U.S. at 4. 
 41. Id. at 24. 
 42. Id. (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)). 
 43. Id. at 24. 
 44. Id. at 26 (quoting Senator Harrison Williams:  “[The federal securities laws] 
provide protection for millions of American investors by requiring full disclosure of 
information in connection with the public offering and trading of securities. These laws have 
worked well in providing the public with adequate information on which to base intelligent 
investment decisions.”) (citation omitted). 
 45. Id. at 32–33.  See also Mark J. Loewenstein, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and 
the Rule 10b-5 Comparisons, 71 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1325 (1983) (explaining how courts 
assessing private rights of action will determine whether the plaintiff is a member of the 
class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted and how tender offerors did not 
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Why should Delaware allow a disgruntled tender offeror a private right of 
action where the Supreme Court and Congress have refused to allow one?
46
 
If the Supreme Court in Piper held that a tender offeror had no 
standing to sue for damages, should a state court be preempted from 
hearing a common law fraud claim that in effect creates the very remedy 
that the Supreme Court denied existence under §14(e)?  Vice Chancellor 
Laster answered this question in the negative, but the statutory structure of 
the Exchange Act combined with subsequent precedential history 
interpreting the Act is not clear. 
The jurisdictional provision in the Exchange Act states: 
The district courts of the United States and the United States 
courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of 
this chapter [15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.] or the rules and 
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at 
law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this 
chapter [15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.] or the rules and regulations 
thereunder.
47
  
However, the Savings Clause in Section 28 of the Exchange Act states 
that “[t]he rights and remedies provided by [the Exchange Act] shall be in 
addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in 
equity . . . .”
48
 
Vice Chancellor Laster acknowledged in his opinion that “if NACCO 
were seeking to enforce Section 13 of the Exchange Act or asserting a 
claim for a violation of Section 13, that claim could be heard only by a 
federal court.”
49
  Furthermore, he stated that some of the language in 
NACCO’s complaint suggested that “NACCO [wa]s trying to replead a 
Section 13 violation as a state law fraud claim.”
50
  Relying on the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Rossdeutscher v. Viacom, Inc., the NACCO 
 
comprise such a class under the Williams Act). 
 46. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977) (“[w]e find no hint in the 
legislative history, on which respondent so heavily relies, that Congress contemplated a 
private cause of action for damages by one of several contending offerors against a 
successful bidder or by a losing contender against the target corporation.”). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006). 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb.  It should be noted that, had the NACCO case been in the form of 
a “covered class action” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f), the common law fraud and 
misrepresentation claims would have been completely preempted.  See, e.g., Behlen v. 
Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1096 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that because plaintiff’s action 
was a “covered class action” asserting state law claims for misrepresentation and/or 
omission “in connection with” the purchase or sale of covered securities it was preempted 
and subject to dismissal). 
 49. NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., 997 A.2d 1, 25 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 50. Id. (citing Rossdeutscher v. Viacom, 768 A.2d 8 (Del. 2001)). 
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court held that it was not preempted from entertaining the common law 
fraud claim against Harbinger.
51
 
Specifically, it is well established that the reference to a federal statute 
in a state court proceeding is not enough to invoke federal court jurisdiction 
and thus preempt the state law action.
52
  As Vice Chancellor Laster 
correctly stated, in the context of the Exchange Act, “removal jurisdiction 
has been held to exist where the state law claim necessarily turned on the 
meaning of federal securities regulations.”
53
  Additionally, state common 
law fraud and misrepresentation claims have both been remanded back to 
state courts by district courts
54
 and retained by district courts on the 
principle of pendent jurisdiction.
55
  Furthermore, it is clear that the 
Supreme Court has contemplated a state law remedy to the “extent that the 
offeror seeks damages for having been wrongfully denied a ‘fair 
opportunity’ to compete for control of another corporation.”
56
 
In this case, where NACCO complained of the fraud in the disclosure, 
it is immaterial to the state law claim that the disclosure happened to be 
required by federal securities regulation.  No interpretation of federal 
securities law is necessary to adjudicate the merits of the common law 
fraud claim.  Accordingly, Vice Chancellor Laster found that the “issue can 
be adjudicated by [Delaware Chancery Courts] as a question of fact, 
separate and independent from what the line items of Schedule 13G and 
Schedule 13D require.”
57
  Vice Chancellor Laster explained that while he 
would only be ruling on Delaware common law, he would not be precluded 
from considering federal standards and precedent as “guideposts” and 
persuasive authority in determining whether the statements were false or 
misleading.
58
  For the aforementioned reasons, as explained by Vice 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. NACCO, 997 A.2d at 22 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & 
Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005)). 
 53. See id. (citing Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 
F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998) for the proposition that removal was proper because the complaint 
stated the issuer had no state law claim unless the defendant violated its own rules which 
were issued pursuant to the Exchange Act directive, thus the case hinged on the 
interpretation of federal regulations). 
 54. See Sung ex rel. Lazard Ltd. v. Wasserstein, 415 F. Supp. 2d 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (allowing remand to state court of claims involving “the issuance of false and/or 
misleading statements, including the preparation of the false and/or misleading press 
releases and SEC filings,” even though the complaint contained references to federal laws). 
 55. See Diceon Elecs., Inc. v. Calvary Partners, L.P., 772 F. Supp. 859, 862 (D. Del. 
1991) (“The Court will therefore not dismiss the plaintiff’s common law fraud claim unless 
all of the plaintiff’s federal causes of action are dismissed and it appears that the Court can 
no longer retain pendent jurisdiction over the state law claim.”). 
 56. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977), (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 
U.S. 78, 84 (1975)). 
 57. NACCO, 997 A.2d at 25. 
 58. Id. (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 
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Chancellor Laster, Delaware courts are probably not preempted in a legal 
sense from hearing the common law fraud action.  As will be discussed in 
later sections, it might be appropriate for Delaware to reexamine its 
precedent in Rossdeutscher given the significant policy implications on the 
tender offer market flowing from the NACCO case. 
C.  Policy Argument Against Allowing a Common Law Fraud Action 
While Vice Chancellor Laster’s decision is probably not violative of 
the text of the Exchange Act, his decision to allow the common law fraud 
claim contradicts the Supreme Court’s decision in Piper prohibiting a 
tender offeror to receive damages.  It is arguable on a policy level that 
Delaware should be hesitant to allow an action where the federal 
government has refused one. 
Congress, in drafting 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a), “d[id] not indicate 
congressional intent to occupy the entire field of securities regulation, but 
rather, to occupy that field only inasmuch as state laws ‘conflict with the 
provisions of [the Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder.’”
59
  
Likewise, the Williams Act does not expressly prohibit states from 
regulating corporate takeovers, but it does carry with it the full strength of 
the Supremacy Clause
60
 in invalidating state laws that have conflicting 
objectives of the Williams Act.
61
  The ultimate interpretation of such acts is 
vested in the Supreme Court of the United States.  Therefore, it seems 
inappropriate for a state court effectively to usurp both Congress’s and the 
Supreme Court’s judgment in fashioning remedies regarding securities 
transactions. 
Simply stated, a disgruntled tender offeror is indifferent to whether his 
access to damages arises from federal or state law.  Even though Vice 
Chancellor Laster was indifferent as to the medium in which the alleged 
misstatements occurred (i.e. in a disclosure mandated by federal securities 
law), it is nonetheless relevant to the policy considerations in this case 
because it is fair to assume that the federal government is best situated to 
determine and fashion remedies for violations of federal securities law.  If 
Congress or the SEC, through its discretionary rulemaking authority, had 
wanted to allow tender offerors to sue for damages as part of the federal 
securities regulatory scheme, they could have easily drafted such a rule.   
 
(2005)). 
 59. Whistler Invs., Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 539 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th 
Cir. 2008) 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 61. See, e.g., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 744 (S.D. Ohio 
1986) (holding the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act, which attempted to restrict 
federally regulated tender offers, to be unconstitutional). 
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D.  Tender Offerors Only Have the Ability to Sue for Injunctive Relief 
Though it is well established that tender offerors do not belong to the 
protected class
62
 in order to sue for damages, courts have held that §14(e) 
“supports the implication of a private right of action on behalf of tender 
offerors suing for injunctive relief . . .  given that in so doing offerors 
would contribute to achieving the provision’s purpose of protecting the 
shareholders from having to confront the offer on the basis of inadequate 
information.”
63
  For example, in a case with facts similar to those in 
NACCO, the tender offeror plaintiff in Humana, Inc. v American Medicorp, 
Inc. alleged that the target corporation made material misrepresentations in 
violation of §14(e) of the Exchange Act.
64
  The offeror then wanted to 
amend its complaint to sue for violations of the Williams Act by a 
competing offeror.
65
  Citing Piper, the court acknowledged that a tender 
offeror does not have standing to sue for damages under the Act because 
allowing such a suit would not be “consistent with the underlying purposes 
of the legislative scheme.”
66
  The Humana Court then stated that Piper
67
 
left open the question of whether a tender offeror could bring a suit for 
injunctive relief against a competing tender offeror.
68
  Ultimately, focusing 
on the narrowness of the opinion in Piper, the district court in Humana 
held that one tender offeror could sue a competing tender offeror for 
injunctive relief.  Specifically, the Supreme Court in Piper approved of 
Judge Friendly’s reasoning in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International 
Controls Corp. that pre-contest injunctive relief, rather than post-contest 
lawsuits, “is the time when relief can best be given.”
69
 
 
 62. See Piper, 430 U.S. at 42 n.28 (“We hold only that a tender offeror, suing in its 
capacity as a takeover bidder, does not have standing to sue for damages under § 14(e).”) 
 63. Richard Cordero, Annotation, Availability of implied right of action under tender 
offer provisions of § 14(d)–(f) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)–
(f)), added to Exchange Act by Williams Act of 1968, and rules promulgated thereunder by 
Securities and Exchange Commission,  120 A.L.R. Fed. 145, § 15a (1994). 
 64. Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).  
It should be noted that, unlike the NACCO case, the plaintiff in this case did not bring state 
common law claims.  Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 614 (citation omitted). 
 67. Piper, 430 U.S. at 48 n.33 (“We intimate no view upon whether as a general 
proposition a suit in equity for injunctive relief, as distinguished from an action for 
damages, would lie in favor of a tender offeror under either § 14(e) or Rule 10b-6.”) 
 68. Humana, 445 F. Supp. at 614. 
 69. Piper, 430 U.S. at 41 (citing Electronic Specialty, 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969); 
see also Edward Ross Aranow et al., Standing to Sue to Challenge Violations of the 
Williams Act, 32 BUS. LAW. 1755, 1761 (1976) (stating that the best time for courts to 
provide relief for misstatements by a target’s management is “at the initial stages of the 
tender offer, when such statements may be corrected or enjoined.”). 
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As one treatise points out, “it is clear that Congress did intend to 
preserve a balance between the positions of a tender offeror and the target’s 
management in contested tender offers,” and that, if a tender offeror were 
prohibited from seeking injunctive relief, “the balance between the legal 
positions . . . would be substantially tipped in favor of the target’s 
management.”
70
  Thus, “it may be argued that Congress intended to create a 
right for offerors to seek injunctive relief against misstatements . . . .”
71
  
The same logic is applicable to a case where a tender offeror is competing 
with another tender offeror rather than the target management.   
There is a strong policy argument against allowing a tender offeror to 
sue for damages because a monetary remedy for a losing tender offeror 
would create an award that “would not redound to the direct benefit of the 
[target shareholders].”
72
  In the case of injunctive relief, the only benefit to 
the tender offeror would be enforcement of the Williams Act, and it would 
therefore also further Congressional goals in protecting shareholders.
73
 
As evidenced above, federal courts have been reluctant to read the 
Williams Act reporting requirements broadly in favor of allowing damages 
stemming from private actions.  It should be noted, however, that in one 
recent decision, CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund Management 
(UK) LLP, a federal district court slightly broadened the scope of 13D 
private actions.
74
  In CSX, a defendant hedge fund used total return swaps 
(“TRS”) to circumvent the Section 13(d) beneficial owner reporting 
requirements.
75
  The court explained that “[t]he purpose of Section 13(d) is 
to alert shareholders of ‘every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of 
securities, regardless of technique employed, which might represent a 
potential shift in corporate control.’”
76
  Therefore, the court concluded that 
“[t]he SEC intended Rule 13d-3(a) to provide a ‘broad definition’ of 
 
 70. Aranow, supra note 69, at 1761. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Piper, 430 U.S. at 39.  This is not the type of state remedy that Congress envisioned 
to supplement federal securities regulation.  Id. at 40.  Rather, state law can coexist with 
federal securities regulation only “where congressional purposes are likely to be undermined 
absent private enforcement, private remedies may be implied in favor of the particular class 
intended to be protected by the statute.”  Id. 
 73. Aranow, supra note 69, at 1761; see also Humana, 445 F. Supp. at 616 (“The 
granting of injunctive relief to an offeror, unlike the award of damages, is consistent with 
the underlying purposes of the Williams Act . . . .”) (quoting 32 BUS.LAW 1755, 1761 (July, 
1977)). 
 74. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 292 F. App’x. 133 (2d Cir. 2008) and aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
remanded, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 75. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 512. 
 76. Id. at 551 (citation omitted). 
D DRORY_FINALIZEDFIVE.DOC(DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2012  11:33 AM 
834 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:3 
 
beneficial ownership so as to ensure disclosure ‘from all those persons who 
have the ability to change or influence control.’”
77
 
However, despite finding that the defendant hedge fund “created and 
used the TRSs with the purpose and effect of preventing the vesting of 
beneficial ownership,” the court fashioned a limited remedy keeping in 
mind the limited availability of private remedies evidenced by the 
Congressional intent behind the Williams Act.
78
  Thus, even though the 
CSX Court read the Section 13(d) provision broadly, it was still reluctant to 
fashion a remedy that would not “redound to the direct benefit of the [target 
shareholders whom the Williams Act was meant to protect]”
79
:  In this case, 
shareholders’ ability to vote their shares.
80
 The Court explained that: 
The Williams Act was intended not only to prevent secret 
accumulation and undisclosed group activities with respect to the 
stock of public companies, but to do so without ‘tipping the 
balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of 
the person making the takeover bid.’  It must be applied, 
especially in private litigation, with due regard for the principle 
that the purpose of private equitable relief is ‘to deter, not to 
punish.’
81
 
Accordingly, the Court only enjoined future violations of Section 
13(d) but chose not to “preclude defendants from voting their CSX shares” 
or enjoin the current proxy solicitation as plaintiffs had requested.
82
  The 
court concluded that any “penalties for defendants’ violations must come 
by way of appropriate action by the SEC or the Department of Justice.”
83
 
This reasoning and the principles that the court applied in CSX are 
applicable to the NACCO case.  Even though there might be a possible 
Section 13(d) violation, courts should be hesitant broadly to grant 
remedies, especially where the remedy has the possibility of negatively 
affecting the very people whom the Williams Act was meant to protect.  
Thus, while the broad Section 13(d) interpretation in CSX was a departure 
from the “norm”, it can still be read as upholding the limiting remedy 
principles inherent in the Williams Act and reinforced by Piper. 
Simply stated, the court in CSX reaffirmed the principle that any 
monetary penalties for Exchange Act violations should flow from the SEC 
or Department of Justice.  Therefore, for continuity and federalism reasons, 
when state courts decide to hear disputes stemming from alleged fraud in 
 
 77. Id. at 540 (citation omitted). 
 78. Id. at 552. 
 79. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 39 (1977). 
 80. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 517. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. 
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Exchange Act mandatory disclosures, like the NACCO case, they should be 
hesitant to overstep clearly established federal principles regarding 
remedies available under said Act. 
E.  Effect on the Market for Corporate Takeovers 
Ignoring the possible burden this holding puts on the federal 
regulatory scheme encompassed in the Williams Act, this holding could 
also upset the balance of power in the takeover market in Delaware.  
Central to this case, and every other merger agreement for that matter, is 
the fact that a termination fee is negotiated in advance in the event that a 
merger agreement is broken.  Termination fees are a vital part of the 
negotiating process as they serve as important deal-protection 
mechanisms.
84
  In Delaware, the importance of negotiating deal protection 
provisions is amplified because such provisions are automatically 
scrutinized by Delaware Courts under fiduciary duty cases such as Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
85
 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,
86
 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
87
 etc. 
In essence, the termination fee, along with other deal protections, 
serves as a form of liquidated damages that gets internalized in the 
dealmaking process by both the acquirer and the target.  If Delaware allows 
a disgruntled acquirer to plead common law fraud after the fact, this 
marginalizes the importance of deal protections such as the termination fee 
and thus disrupts the traditional negotiating process in the corporate 
takeover market.  In effect, all of the litigation risk is borne by the target in 
the event that the target board pursues a better offer and breaks a current 
agreement.  The marginalization of the termination fee as a result of the 
possibility of ex-post litigation (1) creates uncertainty in the deal-making 
process, (2) shifts the balance of negotiating power in favor of the acquirer, 
and (3) hampers the target board’s ability to satisfy their fiduciary duty and 
rationally seek out the best offer for their shareholders.
88
  After this 
holding, a target board cannot fully rely on the fact that the termination fee 
is the opportunity cost to taking a more attractive offer.  If anything, this 
holding will marginalize the value and reliability of deal protections, thus 
hampering prospective deals going forward. 
 
 84. See HOULIHAN LOKEY, 2009 TRANSACTION TERMINATION FEE STUDY (June 2010), 
http://www.hl.com/email/pdf/2009_transaction_termination_fee_study.pdf (“Protective 
devices used by acquirers are heavily negotiated and may include termination fees, ‘lockup’ 
agreements and ‘no-shop’ provisions.”). 
 85. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 86. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 87. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 88. Id. at 182 (holding that when a corporate board decides to put itself up for sale, its 
duty is to maximize the company’s value for the stockholders’ benefit). 
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As part of NACCO and Applica’s original merger agreement, Applica 
paid NACCO a $4 million termination fee and a $2 million expense 
reimbursement.
89
  Furthermore, “[i]n consideration for the increased bid, 
Applica nearly doubled Harbinger’s termination fee—from $ 4 million to $ 
7 million—and increased Harbinger’s expense reimbursement from $ 2 
million to $ 3.3 million.”
90
  It is hard to see why NACCO asked for a 
monetary remedy when they already received their self-negotiated 
opportunity cost of not participating in the deal. 
F. Delaware Courts Should be Cautious in Allowing a Common Law 
Remedy Where Federal Securities Law and Subsequent Supreme 
Court Interpretation Prohibits One 
Taking a closer look at the actual tender offer contest in the NACCO 
case, we can possibly reach the conclusion that allowing the common law 
fraud action undermines the doctrine established by the Delaware Supreme 
Court in Revlon:  The maximization of the sale price for the target 
stockholders’ benefit when a target company decides to sell itself.
91
  Upon 
further examination, it is arguable that there is limited deterrent effect in 
allowing a damages action; therefore, any justification must lie in the 
retributive nature regarding the possible unfair bargaining position of one 
potential acquirer over another. 
Harbinger’s original offer on September 14, 2006 was to acquire all of 
the outstanding shares of Applica that it did not already own for $6.00 per 
share.
92
  In conjunction with this topping bid, Applica paid NACCO 
liquidated damages in the form of a “$4 million termination fee and $2 
million in expense reimbursement that the Hamilton Beach Merger 
Agreement called for in the event the agreement was validly terminated to 
accept a topping bid.”
93
  It was not until November 2, 2006 when Applica 
filed a preliminary proxy that NACCO became aware of possible fraud in 
Harbinger’s Schedule 13Ds.
94
  Therefore, injunctive relief in the pre-
contest stage of the case was not available to NACCO.
95
  NACCO could 
not have filed an injunction barring or seeking correction of the faulty 
 
 89. NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., 997 A.2d 1, 13 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; see also William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and 
Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1424 (2007) (“The corporate law of mergers and 
acquisitions devotes itself to assuring that the selling shareholders get a fair price . . . .”). 
 92. NACCO, 997 A.2d at 11. 
 93. Id. at 12. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Elec. Specialty Co. v. Int’l Controls Corp., 409 F. 2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969) 
(stating that the application for preliminary injunction is the most effective time for courts to 
grant equitable relief). 
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statements prior to the transaction because it was not until after Applica 
jilted them for the Harbinger agreement that the fraud became known.
96
  It 
is arguable that, just as Congress intended a balance of legal positions 
between an offeror and target management so too should there be a balance 
of legal positions between competing offerors.
97
  As NACCO correctly 
points out, they were disadvantaged in a pure bidding war because 
Harbinger “had the benefit of owning a nearly 40% block that it had 
acquired for much lower prices at a time when NACCO was limited by a 
standstill agreement.”
98
 
Despite the possible fairness justifications discussed above, an 
examination of Supreme Court precedent, albeit in a different context than 
in the current case, supports the argument that Vice Chancellor Laster’s 
decision to permit ex-post common law fraud scrutiny of federal 
disclosures in a tender offer scenario undermines the underlying goals of 
the Williams Act and therefore should not be binding precedent.  As 
explained in Section H of this article, Delaware has a policy and financial 
interest in preventing the federalization of corporate law.  Accordingly, 
Delaware Courts should proceed cautiously in fashioning remedies where 
the federal government has explicitly prohibited them. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in Schreiber v. Burlington 
Northern, Inc.,
99
 albeit in a different context, clearly stated that application 
by judges of “their own sense of what constitutes unfair or artificial 
conduct would inject uncertainty into the tender offer process.”
100
  The 
Supreme Court in Schreiber explained that: 
An essential piece of information—whether the court would 
deem the fully disclosed actions of one side or the other to be 
“manipulative”—would not be available until after the tender 
offer had closed.  This uncertainty would directly contradict the 
expressed congressional desire to give investors full information. 
     Congress’ consistent emphasis on disclosure persuades us that 
it intended takeover contests to be addressed to shareholders.  In 
pursuit of this goal, Congress, consistent with the core 
mechanism of the Securities Exchange Act, created sweeping 
disclosure requirements and narrow substantive safeguards.  The 
same Congress that placed such emphasis on shareholder choice 
 
 96. NACCO, 997 A.2d at 12. 
 97. See Aranow, supra note 69, at 1761 (arguing that Congress did not intend for courts 
to tip the balance of interests in favor of target management by denying standing to tendor 
offerors seeking injunction under the Williams Act). 
 98. NACCO, 997 A.2d at 13 (explaining that, for every $1 Harbinger increased its bid, 
Harbinger’s cost was only increased by 60 cents). 
 99. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).  Schreiber pertains to a target company not accepting tendered 
shares.  Id. 
 100. Id. at 12. 
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would not at the same time have required judges to oversee 
tender offers for substantive fairness.
101
 
The above principle can be applied to NACCO.  Because (1) the 
damages award would not be determined until after Applica (target) 
shareholders approved the merger, and (2) the cost of any damages award 
would be borne by Applica (target) shareholders, the Applica (target) 
shareholders would not be fully informed of the ultimate price for which 
they were selling their shares at the time they decided to tender.  It is 
irrelevant that the damages emanate from state law rather than federal law 
as in Schreiber since tendering shareholders are completely indifferent to 
the source.
102
  Unfortunately, in some rare cases perceived inequities may 
occur between bidders.  However, this is no excuse to allow state law the 
opportunity to undermine the goals of the Securities Exchange Act. 
As previously discussed by the Piper court,
103
 a damages award in this 
type of case would simply be a wealth transfer from innocent shareholders 
of Applica to the losing tender offeror.  Furthermore, this unfairness in 
bidding most likely had little effect on the final price from the target 
shareholders’ perspective but rather only affected which competing offeror 
was ultimately successful.
104
  From a shareholder’s perspective, the bidding 
war was successful in raising Harbinger’s initial bid of $6.00 by more than 
40% up to $8.25.
105
  If Delaware’s goal in assigning damages is shareholder 
protection (wealth maximization), then a damages remedy in NACCO does 
not seem to be justified. 
Ultimately, because misstatements and omissions in a Schedule 13D 
can give rise to federal criminal convictions and other penalties, hedge 
funds typically take their Schedule 13D filing obligations very seriously.
106
  
Thus the deterrent effect of the possibility of a common law damages 
award is overshadowed by the deterrent effect of federal penalties under the 
Exchange Act. 
As Vice Chancellor Laster makes clear, this is a case-specific ruling at 
the motion to dismiss stage, and thus the precedential value of this holding 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Simply stated, federally-imposed damages have the same effect on tendering 
shareholders as state-imposed damages. 
 103. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 39 (1977). 
 104. This assumes that Applica would have committed the same amount of out-of-pocket 
money to the bid.  Thus, had they owned a lesser percentage of the shares, the price per 
share they would have been willing to pay for all of Applica would have been lower than 
$8.05 and therefore NACCO would have been the likely winner in the bidding war. 
 105. NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., 997 A.2d 1, 13 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 106. Derek D. Bork & Jurgita Ashley, Greenmail Disgorgement Statutes And Corporate 
By-Law Provisions Could Trap Activist Hedge Funds, 4 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 57, 63 
(Winter 2009). 
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with respect to future scrutiny of federal securities disclosures is arguably 
limited.
107
 
G.  The Reliance Element of a Common Law Fraud Claim is Questionable 
A broad reading of Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion is that any 
federal disclosure is now open to the possibility of a state common law 
fraud action.  A narrow reading is that Delaware will only intervene in 
actions between competing bidders where federal securities law leaves a 
void for the possibility of a damages award.  Regardless, as Vice 
Chancellor Laster made perfectly clear,
108
 NACCO is only at the motion to 
dismiss stage and therefore it is not certain that NACCO would have 
succeed at trial.
109
 
One of the factors in a Delaware common law fraud case is reliance.
110
  
However, unlike federal securities law, which permits the fraud-on-the-
market theory that implies reliance based on the materiality of the 
misstatement,
111
 Delaware common law requires that a plaintiff show actual 
reliance.
112
  Even Vice Chancellor Laster conceded that he was “troubled 
by the reliance inquiry” and “[e]ven based on the unusual and extreme facts 
pled in the Complaint, [he] view[ed] it as a close call.”
113
  I find most 
persuasive Vice Chancellor’s statement that at “some point it became 
unreasonably naive for NACCO to trust that a hedge fund engaging in 
conduct resembling a creeping takeover wanted only to receive its ratable 
share of the benefits of the existing deal.”
114
  However, the changing 
landscape of activist hedge funds makes this line even harder to draw ex 
post. 
Hedge funds have taken a more moderate role in the market for 
corporate control than during the 1980s era of corporate raiders and 
greenmailers.
115
  “Engagements in the 1980s tended to have all or nothing 
outcomes—either the activist took over the firm, the firm went private or 
otherwise paid off its shareholders with the proceeds of a leveraged 
 
 107. NACCO, 997 A.2d at 32. 
 108. Id. at 18. 
 109. This case has since settled out of court. 
 110. NACCO, 997 A.2d at 29. 
 111. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (U.S. 1988) (“An investor who buys or 
sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. 
Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor’s 
reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed . . . .”). 
 112. NACCO, 997 A.2d at 29 (citing Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467, 474 (Del. 
1992)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 32 (stating that “the line when NACCO’s reliance became unreasonable is 
difficult to draw and is not something [he would] address on a motion to dismiss”). 
 115. Bratton, supra note 91, at 1424; Bork & Ashley, supra note 106, at 61. 
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restructuring, or the firm stayed independent, perhaps after making a 
greenmail payment.”
116
  In the current environment, hedge fund activism 
rarely triggers changes in control; rather, activists often use their power to 
acquire board seats.
117
  This might support Vice Chancellor Laster’s 
decision to allow the suit because it makes NACCO’s reliance on 
Harbinger’s statement that they only had “investment” purposes more 
reasonable. 
On the contrary, it is arguable that the magnitude of Harbinger’s 
accumulation of Applica stock (a nearly forty percent block) significantly 
increases the likelihood that Harbinger sought a change in control and 
therefore negates any legitimate claim of reliance by a sophisticated party 
like in NACCO.
118
  Furthermore, based on the facts of the case it appears 
that any unfairness in the transaction was already attempted to be 
compensated for by the termination and expense fees, which Applica even 
increased following the bidding contest.
119
 
As Vice Chancellor Laster states, not allowing a damages claim even 
where reliance is questionable would allow “some market players [to] 
insulate themselves at the pleadings stage from claims based on false 
disclosures by arguing that others should know how close to the line they 
like to play and that their disclosures really should never be believed.”
120
  
The idea of “insulating wrongdoers and penalizing victims”
121
 is not 
compatible with Delaware law, or federal securities law for that matter.  
However, situations like the one in NACCO seem to be fairly unique, and 
in balancing the harms between (1) a sophisticated losing bidder who in 
almost all circumstances has a termination fee
122
 as liquidated damages, and 
(2) innocent shareholders of the target corporation, courts, especially those 
in Delaware, should lean towards the latter. 
H.  Will Delaware be Used as a “Vehicle for Fraud”? 
One final justification Vice Chancellor Laster offers in favor of 
allowing Delaware common law fraud actions stemming from statements 
filed in accordance with federal securities law is that “Delaware has a 
powerful interest of its own in preventing the entities that it charters from 
 
 116. Bratton, supra note 91, at 1427. 
 117. Id. at 1427–28. 
 118. NACCO, 997 A.2d at 13. 
 119. Id.  (“In consideration for the increased bid, Applica nearly doubled Harbinger’s 
termination fee—from $ 4 million to $ 7 million—and increased Harbinger’s expense 
reimbursement from $ 2 million to $ 3.3 million.”). 
 120. Id. at 32. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Edith Hotchkiss et al., Holdups, Renegotiation, and Termination Fees in Mergers 
(May 2010),  https://www2.bc.edu/~qianju/Deal-protection-25May2010.pdf. 
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being used as vehicles for fraud” and that “Delaware’s legitimacy as a 
chartering jurisdiction depends on it.”
123
  Specifically, he is concerned that 
Delaware might suffer the same fate that West Virginia did at the turn of 
the twentieth century when it utterly failed to attract incorporations as a 
result of offering the “loosest, most liberal law of any state in the union.”
124
 
First, the notion of inter-jurisdictional competition between the fifty 
states for incorporation has long fizzled since the time of the 
swashbuckling West Virginians to which Vice Chancellor Laster refers 
us.
125
  More recent academics are less inclined to believe that substantial 
inter-jurisdictional competition exists.
126
 Therefore, it is questionable that 
“Delaware’s legitimacy as a chartering jurisdiction depends” on its ability 
to allow a common law fraud action for damages by a disgruntled tender 
offeror.
127
 
It is undisputed that Delaware has a substantial interest in maintaining 
its presence as the state with the highest incidence of incorporation.  
Delaware is already home to over 60 percent of the Fortune 500 
companies
128
 and half of all U.S. firms traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ.
129
  As of the end of the 2009 fiscal year, the 
Delaware Division of Corporations had collected a record high of $767 
million in incorporations’ revenue, accounting for 25% of the State’s 
general fund.
130
  A Delaware shift from being the premier place to 
incorporate would have a substantial negative effect on the state.  However, 
any threat from other states as Vice Chancellor Laster is concerned with in 
NACCO
131
 seems to be minimal at best.
132
  Rather the real threat to 
 
 123. NACCO, 997 A.2d at 26. 
 124. See id. (quoting Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for Corporate 
Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 365 
(2007)). 
 125. Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 1, 5 (2009) (“recent thinking is skeptical that interjurisdictional competition is intense”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. NACCO, 997 A.2d at 26. 
 128. DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS 2009 ANNUAL 
REPORT 1 (2009). 
 129. DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS 2005 ANNUAL 
REPORT 1 (2005). 
 130. Id. at 2. 
 131. See NACCO, 997 A.2d at 26 (revealing Vice Chancellor Laster’s concern that if 
Delaware develops a reputation for permitting fraudulent schemes, it will lose its attraction 
to incorporations just as West Virginia and South Dakota did in the early 1900s). 
 132. Roe, supra note 125, at 5 ( 
Most states have not invested in developing good business courts, they do not 
try to make the corporate law that managers and shareholders want, and their 
per-firm rate card for franchise fees does not have them charging enough to 
strongly motivate themselves to attract more incorporations. Delaware is alone 
in competing day-to-day for corporate charters and franchise fees. 
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Delaware’s “cash cow” is the threat of federalization of corporate law from 
Washington.
133
  For this reason it is clear that “Delaware does seem to 
formulate policy with an eye on Washington.”
134
  As Mark Roe further 
explained:  “Delaware players are not oblivious to the possibility that 
federal authorities can act.  When the issue is big enough that it could 
attract Washington’s attention, they have reason to consider what 
Washington would do, and they often have reason not to instigate 
Washington to displace them . . . .”
135
 Keeping this principle in mind, it is 
arguable that Delaware Courts should be hesitant to provide a remedy that 
has the possibility of meddling with the (1) the Williams Act and (2) the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent interpretation
136
 of said act.  By allowing a 
common law damages award to a losing tender offeror, where such remedy 
is prohibited under federal securities law, the Delaware Chancery Court is 
possibly instigating Washington to intervene. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In examining whether Delaware should offer a common law fraud 
action, thus opening up the availability of a damages award, stemming 
from alleged misstatements in federally mandated disclosure, I come to the 
opposite conclusion of Vice Chancellor Laster in the NACCO case.  
Specifically, (1) an ex-post award like this has the potential to disrupt the 
market for corporate takeovers by marginalizing ex-ante negotiated deal 
protections; (2) tender offerors are not part of the protected class which 
Congress sought to protect with the Williams Act; (3) the Supreme Court 
has already spoken as to the availability of a damages award; (4) allowing a 
state damages award in this context contravenes said Congressional intent 
and Supreme Court precedent; and (5) offering such remedy would 
contradict Delaware’s interest in delaying/preventing the federalization of 
corporate law.  As previously noted, Vice Chancellor Laster was correctly 
applying binding Delaware Supreme Court precedent of Rossdeutscher v. 
Viacom.  For the aforementioned reasons, it might be prudent for Delaware 
to reexamine this case.
137
 
 
). 
 133. Id. at 6–7 (explaining that a “very large portion of the law governing the 
corporation is not made in a jurisdictional race but by a national political authority, such as 
Congress, the SEC, or the federal courts”). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 8. 
 136. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1977) (“Congress was 
intent upon regulating takeover bidders . . . in order to protect the shareholders of target 
companies . . . . [T]ender offerors were not the intended beneficiaries of the bill . . . .”). 
 137. Rossdeutscher v. Viacom, 768 A.2d 8, 8 (Del. 2001). 
